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While the past century of neuroscientific research has brought considerable progress
in defining the boundaries of the human cerebral cortex, there are cases in which the
demarcation of one area from another remains fuzzy. Despite the existence of clearly
demarcated areas, examples of gradual transitions between areas are known since
early cytoarchitectonic studies. Since multi-modal anatomical approaches and functional
connectivity studies brought renewed attention to the topic, a better understanding of
the theoretical and methodological implications of fuzzy boundaries in brain science
can be conceptually useful. This article provides a preliminary conceptual framework to
understand this problem by applying philosophical theories of vagueness to three levels
of neuroanatomical research. For the first two levels (cytoarchitectonics and fMRI studies),
vagueness will be distinguished from other forms of uncertainty, such as imprecise
measurement or ambiguous causal sources of activation. The article proceeds to discuss
the implications of these levels for the anatomical study of connectivity between cortical
areas. There, vagueness gets imported into connectivity studies since the network
structure is dependent on the parcellation scheme and thresholds have to be used to
delineate functional boundaries. Functional connectivity may introduce an additional form
of vagueness, as it is an organizational principle of the brain. The article concludes by
discussing what steps are appropriate to define areal boundaries more precisely.
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INTRODUCTION
In a recent article on the advantages of using functional regions of
interest (fROI) in human brain imaging, Rebecca Saxe, Mathew
Brett, and Nancy Kanwisher caution the interested layman not to
misuse or over-interpret neuroscientific results:
The “activation map” images that commonly accompany brain
imaging papers can be misleading to inexperienced readers,
by seeming to suggest that the boundaries between “activated”
and “unactivated” patches of cortex are unambigous and sharp.
Instead, as most researchers are aware, the apparent sharp bound-
aries are subject to the choice of threshold applied to the statistical
tests that generate the image. What, then, justifies dividing the
cortex into regions with boundaries based on this fuzzy, mutable
measure of functional profile?
(Saxe et al., 2010, p. 39).
Saxe and colleagues proceed their discussion in pointing out
that it is an empirical question whether fROIs have precise
boundaries or not, and that neuroscientists do not have to avoid
fuzziness, since it is “a feature of many scientifically respectable
objects, including ocean currents like the Gulf Stream, geograph-
ical features like Mt. Fuji, and human body parts like knees and
elbows” (Saxe et al., 2010). As long as the neuroscientific commu-
nity reaches consensus about what they are referring to, fuzziness
in the brain seems just a usual feature of scientific research.
The problem of imprecisely defined (scientific) objects is
known in philosophy under the name of “vagueness”: concepts
are vague when they allow borderline cases of application. For
these cases it is unclear whether the concept still applies or
not, independent from the lack of knowledge. Saxe and col-
leagues are correct in assuming that vagueness is a ubiquitous
phenomenon in both scientific and everyday language (Russell,
1923). But in claiming that vagueness is merely an empirical issue
which requires a consensual solution, and in not distinguishing
vagueness from ambiguity or uncertainty due to technological
shortcomings, they also express an opinion which is indicative
of how most neuroscientists think about boundaries of cortical
areas in general (and not just of fROIs). Since the theoretical lit-
erature on vagueness and its application to fields as different as
law and geography (Endicott, 2001; Varzi, 2001) seems largely
unknown to neuroscientists, this paper attempts to provide a pre-
liminary conceptual framework to understand the phenomenon
of vagueness in neuroanatomy (“The Philosophical Concept of
Vagueness”).1 “Gradual Transitions in Cytoarchitectonic Studies
1The perspective of this paper is to understand neuroanatomical research
from a philosophical viewpoint. The presented neuroscientific examples and
the arguments based on them are not meant to be an external criticism of these
studies, but are used to make a general, constructively critical point about
issues of vagueness in the study of the human cortex. Any empirical ques-
tions generated by this analysis have to be left open for further neuroscientific
research.
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of Brain Anatomy” and “Thresholds and Measurement of Neural
Activity with fMRI” describe vagueness at two levels of neu-
roscientific research, namely for (1) cytoarchitectonics, where
cortical areas are identified at the level of neurons and for (2)
voxel activation at the level of intra-areal neuronal interaction
measured by the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD)-signal
of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). “Implications
of Vagueness for Mapping Connectivity of the Human Cerebral
Cortex” proceeds to discuss the implications of (1) and (2)
for distinguishing areas on the level of inter-areal connectivity.
“Anatomical Connectivity and Overlapping Networks” explores
vagueness in recent attempts to define networks of anatom-
ical connectivity using structural MRI and diffusion tractog-
raphy. “Functional Connectivity I: Edge Detection Algorithms
and Functional Boundaries” discusses the use of resting state
fMRI and computer vision algorithms to delineate functional
boundaries between cortical areas. “Functional Connectivity II:
Research Contexts and Combinatory Vagueness” discusses fur-
ther the conceptual vagueness of the term “functional connectiv-
ity.” The paper concludes by arguing that when these implications
of vagueness are reflected, this may help to understand which
attempts of defining areal boundaries more precisely are admis-
sible and methodologically sound.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF VAGUENESS
In order to understand what kinds of vagueness arise at differ-
ent levels of neuroanatomical research, some general distinctions
from the philosophical literature need to be introduced. The
classical form of degree-vagueness leads to the so-called “Sorites-
paradox” (for an overview see Keefe and Smith, 1996): as often
explicated based on the paradigmatic example of a heap (greek:
soros), a clear case of applying a concept (e.g., “10,000 grains of
sand make up a heap”) is taken as the premise of an argument
which proceeds by small steps (“If 10,000 grains of sand are a
heap, 9999 grains of sand are a heap too”) toward a paradoxi-
cal conclusion (“0 grains of sand are a heap”). At some point in
this series the concept failed to apply, but exactly where its exten-
sion ended is impossible to tell because there are borderline cases
(e.g., “7 grains of sand make up a heap”) for which it is inde-
terminate whether the propositions expressed by the sentences
that contain vague predicates are true or false (they have so-called
truth value gaps cf. Tye, 1990). The class of borderline cases itself
shares a fuzzy boundary with the clear cases and non-cases, which
is called “higher-order-vagueness” (Williamson, 1994). Distinct
from the vagueness concerning the extension of predicates (i.e.,
the class of objects which fall under a certain concept) is the so-
called “problem of the many” (Unger, 1980). Here it is unclear
whether a certain material part belongs to an object (e.g., a chunk
of rock at the base of Mt. Fuji). Because of their fuzzy spa-
tiotemporal boundaries, it is impossible to unequivocally pick
out these objects amongst others of their kind, which is why
this form is called “vagueness of individuation” (or object vague-
ness). Common to both forms is that they (a) allow for borderline
cases (of application/membership), (b) have fuzzy boundaries
(extensional/spatiotemporal), and (c) that the objects/concepts in
question are tolerant to small changes. Degree-vagueness can fur-
thermore arise both from categorical properties, like the number
of grains of sand, or gradable ones, like the shade of a color. The
attempt to resolve degree-vagueness by introducing many dimen-
sions can lead to combinatory vagueness, where it is unclear
which or how many conditions have to be fulfilled to pick out an
object or apply a concept (see section “Functional Connectivity II:
Research Contexts and Combinatory Vagueness”). Additionally,
predication and object vagueness can be understood to be seman-
tic, i.e., a resulting from the imprecision of language (Russell,
1923) or to be ontic, i.e., resulting partly from the world itself,
because it is such that knowledge about the presence or absence of
a certain property is impossible (Hyde, 2007). Since the question
of ontic and semantic vagueness is controversially discussed in the
philosophical literature, the preliminary framework given here is
as neutral as possible to which type is more appropriate to under-
stand vagueness in neuroanatomy. It is more important for the
present purposes that vagueness is to be distinguished from epis-
temic uncertainty, where indeterminacy merely arises through
incomplete knowledge or technological shortcomings. In the
empirical sciences, these are usually co-existing and overlapping
types of indeterminacy.
GRADUAL TRANSITIONS IN CYTOARCHITECTONIC
STUDIES OF BRAIN ANATOMY
When dealing with vagueness, it is always important to keep
in mind that it does not imply that for every case it is uncer-
tain whether to apply a certain concept (e.g., “heap” to 10,000
grains of sand), or whether a certain material part belongs to
an object (e.g., the peak of Mt. Fuji). The same is true for the
anatomy of the brain, where non-peripheral points can be eas-
ily identified as being part of an area in question, and where
examples of well-defined and clearly delineated areas such as
the primary visual cortex exist (Hinds et al., 2009). But besides
these clear examples, the problem of gradual transitions between
cortical areas has been known since the early cytoarchitectonic
studies of brain structure, where histological sections of post-
mortem brains were stained to reveal differences in the laminar
pattern of different areas, based e.g., on size, shape, and den-
sity of neuronal cells, or relative/absolute thickness of the cortex.
Korbinian Brodmann, the author of one of the most well-known
and widely used parcellation schemes of the human cortex, took a
decidedly pragmatic position on the issue of determining bound-
aries in the brain. Although noticing that the cytoarchtitectonic
features mentioned above sometimes change abruptly and some-
times gradually between areas, he maintained that “nevertheless
the maps bring the position and the mutual relations between
the regions correctly into view, and everyone will be able to apply
them with great utility in comparative studies, as long as one does
not search more in it than they should be: a tool for orientation”
(Brodmann, 1909, p. 126, emphasis in original, my translation).
In the mid of the last century, von Bonin and Bailey (1951) drew
the more radical conclusion that the great variability of cytoar-
chitectonic features prohibits to draw any sharp boundary in the
human cortex, which was a common feature of most former
brain atlases (Campbell, 1905; Smith, 1907; Economo and von
Koskinas, 1925; Vogt and Vogt, 1925; Sarkissov et al., 1949). While
abandoning any precise demarcations may have been indeed a too
radical conclusion, the recognition of gradual transitions by these
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prominent historical figures indicates that the spatial distribution
of cortico-anatomical properties can be crucial for a systematic
understanding of vagueness in neuroanatomy.
Consider the following example: A characteristic feature of
Brodmann’s area 4 is the presence of giant pyramidal cells
(Betz-cells) in layer V, but their size varies considerably between
different individuals, both in height (60–120 μm) and width (30–
60 μm) (Amunts et al., 2002). But even in a single individual,
Betz-cells can be found outside of area 4, and the distance between
them increases toward area 6 (Economo and von Koskinas, 1925;
Zilles et al., 1995). If the concept of a cortical area is defined
as a homogenous and architectonically distinct region in the
brain (Amunts et al., 2002) then it becomes apparent why the
definition of area 4 based on the Betz-cell criterion is multi-
ply vague. First, height and width are gradable properties that
introduce indeterminacy into the definition of what a Betz-cell
is (equivalent to how big a grain of sand can be to still count as
sand). Thus, a Sorites-series could be constructed ordering the
slices from different individuals according to the size, in which
there would be borderline cases of how big or small a Betz-cell
can be at each end of the series. The size vagueness of Betz-
cells itself does not pose an issue for delineating the cortical
boundary of area 4, however, because it only arises by compar-
ing different individuals, while for each single slice the Betz-cells
can be precisely identified (see below). The more severe form of
vagueness is that by following the increasing distance of Betz-
cells toward area 6 in a single slice, area 4 cannot be precisely
individuated: at the periphery there are parts such that it is
indeterminate whether the proposition expressed by the sentence
“X is part of area 4” is true or false. At the end of the move-
ment from area 4 to 6 is a point for which it is clearly false
to say it belongs to area 4, but which has been derived from
following the presence of Betz-cells in a step-wise manner. Of
course neuroanatomical research is in practice preserved from the
paradoxical conclusion by considering additional cytoarchitec-
tonic modalities such as granularity as well as myeloarchitecture
(Sanides, 1964), receptor binding sites (Jansen et al., 1991), or
integrating areas into mechanistic explanations by specifying
their functional roles in cognitive tasks (Craver, 2007). But to
discard the Sorites-paradox entirely because of these possibili-
ties would be to miss the idea of the argument, because in the
case of the heap, one property is picked out while others are
being held constant or regarded as irrelevant (such as shape of
the pile or color of the grains). It can be still maintained that
the one-dimensional gradual transitions of a property along the
cortex is the basis for the phenomenon of vagueness in neu-
roanatomy. Although multi-modal approaches often reduce the
problem of gradual transitions to practically manageable issues,
they could still be facing multidimensional vagueness (see section
“Functional Connectivity II: Research Contexts and Combinatory
Vagueness”), because it can be unclear which dimension should
be prioritized when modalities point toward different boundary
locations.
Gradual transitions of cytoarchitectonic properties become a
challenge for brain mapping, however, when they are distributed
in a way that a whole cortical area is considered a transi-
tional zone because it shares some, but not all cytoarchitectonic
properties of its adjacent neighbors. A prominent example is the
transitional area 9/46 in the human prefrontal cortex (Rajkowska
and Goldman-Rakic, 1995a,b). This area shares with area 9 a pale
sublayer Vb, and with area 46 a distinct layer IV and uniformely
sized cells in layers III and V. Additionally, this transitional area
shares combined features at the periphery toward other areas
(classified as 9–8, 9–45, 46–10, and 46–45) and cannot be sep-
arated distinctly to areas 9 or 46 based on myeloarchitecture.2
Thus, both of Brodmann’s traditional designations represent
cases of extensional vagueness where borderline cases have been
observed already (in contrast to intensional vagueness, where
borderline cases are merely possible, cf. Fine, 1975): it is inde-
terminate for parts now designated as area 9/46 whether they
belong to area 9 or 46, respectively. But despite the persistence
of these cases in light of additional anatomical modalities, the
extensionally vague boundary between area 9 and 46 remains
relative, since until now there has been no parcellation of these
areas based on the differential distribution of receptor binding
sites. There are good reasons, however, to regard this case as an
absolute case of vagueness—where evidence from all modalities
reveals an indeterminacy—although this is an hypothesis which
has to await further empirical research. First, albeit chemoarchi-
tecture can show abrupt transitions between well-defined areas
(such as V1 and V2, Zilles et al., 2002), not all receptors show
areal boundaries equally (Zilles et al., 1995), and some are also
heterogeneously distributed within an area (e.g., GABAa recep-
tors within area V1, Zilles and Schleicher, 1993). Second, even if
these receptor bindings reveal differences within this transitional
area, functional segregation alone does not constitute an archi-
tectonic entity (Amunts et al., 2002), partly because mechanistic
explanations of functions usually do not consider organizational
features that are irrelevant to the explanandum phenomenon
(cf. Craver, 2007, p. 144). Third, according to Rakic, the transi-
tional area 9/46 may also represent a newly evolving structure in
the brain, which therefore does not yet reveal any distinguishing
features (Rakic, 1988). Considering these constraints to pre-
cisely determine which parts of 9/46 belong decisively to one
of the neighboring areas, it seems reasonable to assume that,
for any meaningful timescale of actual research, the architec-
tonic definitions of areas 9 and 46 based on structural cell
2Transitional zones are also found in non-human animals, such as area 17/18
in the cat visual cortex (Payne, 1990), which is not only cytoarchitectonically
defined as intermediary between area 17 and 18, but also represents a grey
zone with regard to neuronal preference of spatial frequencies (Ohki et al.,
2000). Since the focus of this special issue is the neuroanatomy of the human
cerebral cortex, area 9/46 will be discussed in greater detail. It should be noted
that the history of anatomical research on this area is considerably more com-
plex than presented here. Not only did Walker (1940) classify parts of area 9 as
area 46 not present in earlier cortical maps of the macaque brain (Brodmann,
1905; Vogt and Vogt, 1925), but also did these delineations not resemble the
designations of area 9 and 46 for the human brain (Brodmann, 1909). In order
to accommodate for the research needs of both communities, Petrides and
Pandya (1999) created a uniform vocabulary for human and primate anatomy,
and furthermore subdivided area 9/46 in a dorsal and ventral portion based
on comparative studies. Note however, that this conventional definition of
uniform vocabulary does not change the transitional nature of area 9/46 as
outlined by Rajkowska and Goldman-Rakic (1995a).
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properties will remain vague.3 Additionally, the introduction of
a transitional zone only collects all the borderline cases from
the neighboring areas (which is itself a vague class, see section
“The Philosophical Concept of Vagueness”), instead of provid-
ing a solution of how to deal with a fuzzy boundary in each
case.
In summary, it becomes evident that gradual transitions are
a well-known issue in the cytoarchitectonic study of the brain,
and that they can be illuminated by applying the conceptual
framework of the philosophical vagueness literature. Notice that
vagueness in these cases is closely related, but not identical to
the uncertainty of measurement arising from inter-individual
variability. It is certainly one of the biggest challenges of neu-
roanatomy to describe higher cortical areas, such as Broca’s region
(Brodmann area 44 and 45), whose position and size varies highly,
additionally to subtle changes of cell properties, between different
individuals (Fischl et al., 2008). Although this variability makes
locational assignments in functional imaging studies problem-
atic (Devlin and Poldrack, 2007), the vagueness here described
does not arise from comparative studies, because the cytoar-
chitectonic criteria fail to identify an area’s position precisely
even in the case of a singular instance (Schneider and Erwig,
1997). Probabilistic cytoarchitectonic maps do not address the
issue of gradual transitions either, because they do not deal with
imprecision on the individual but on the group level, which is
why they face the problem of arbitrary thresholding (see sec-
tion “Gradual Transitions in Cytoarchitectonic Studies of Brain
Anatomy”).
THRESHOLDS AND MEASUREMENT OF NEURAL
ACTIVITY WITH fMRI
The cautionary remark of Saxe and colleagues quoted in the
introduction was concerned with the allegedly sharp and unam-
biguous localization of cognitive functions via fMRI, rather than
the structural exploration of brain anatomy. What both levels
of research have in common is that they deal with overlapping,
but analytically distinguishable issues of measurement uncer-
tainty, technological limitations, and vagueness which is due
to the underlying properties of the brain. Logothetis (2008)
investigated the first two issues with regard to the physiolog-
ical interpretation of the BOLD-signal. He characterized this
interpretation of the BOLD-contrast as ambiguous, since dif-
ferent levels of oxygenation alone are insufficient to conclude
whether the cortical mircocircuits are largely inhibitory, exci-
tatory or whether inhibition and excitation balance each other
out. “Ambiguity” here does not refer to the linguistic notion,
where there is an over-determination of conventionally estab-
lished semantic meanings, but to the missing specificity of the
signal when identifying the brain’s physiological organization.
Since changes in the fMRI signal can include spiking output,
neuromodulatory effects, and feedback loops within cortical
microcircuits, establishing the convergence of imaging studies
3If the cytoarchitectonic properties are interpreted as identity conditions for
cortical areas, then these areas could be even considered vague objects (Tye,
1990), although this position remains controversial and has been criticized
repeatedly (Russell, 1923; Varzi, 2001).
with electrophysiological evidence remains challenging (Bartels
et al., 2008). But this ambiguity of the signal is not equiva-
lent to its imprecision, although in practice, fMRI can comprise
measurement uncertainties due to downstream effects, where
activations come from other areas (Tehovnik et al., 2006) or
signal blurring across gyri due to the magnetization of brain
tissue (Ojemann et al., 1997). What the underspecification of
the causal source regarding a signal change has in common
with linguistic ambiguity, is that it could be resolved when it is
specified what the speaker/signal refers to. Just as the ambigu-
ous term “bank” has two precise and disjunctive meanings
(“financial institution” or “edge of a river” cf. Zhang, 1998),
the BOLD-signal implies a well-understood physiological entity
(inhibitory-excitatory networks) measured by a well-defined unit
of measurement (deoxyhemoglobin). Although fMRI alone may
not provide the technological means to specify between the
different physiological possibilities (Logothetis, 2008), its ambi-
guity should not be confused with measurement uncertainty or
vagueness.
Suppose for a moment one could distinguish between the
different physiological interpretations of the BOLD-signal by reg-
istering fMRI data to electrophysiological evidence in a hitherto
unconsidered way. It is usually assumed by philosophers that
vagueness would not be eliminated by such additional informa-
tion, just like the disambiguation of a term just specifies which
one of the precise multiple meanings is expressed, while leav-
ing the fuzzy referential boundary of a vague concept unchanged
(Zhang, 1998). This distinction is maintained in the case of mea-
suring brain activity with the fMRI signal, because the source
of vagueness here is a more abstract and general property of
the brain than its specific physiological organization: The brain
is a causally dense system, where almost every neuron is (at
least weakly) causally connected to every other neuron (Savoy,
2001). Now the “activation maps” mentioned earlier by Saxe
and colleagues, consist of null hypothesis significance tests for
each three-dimensional voxel in the brain. The shown activa-
tions correspond to a chosen threshold (α-value) which indicates
the probability that the data would have been occurred, in case
the null hypothesis would have been correct (Gigerenzer, 2004).
But since the null hypothesis—that the experimental task had no
effect on the data—is for causally dense systems always strictly
speaking false, there is no rational justification for setting the sig-
nificance threshold at any particular value. Moreover, since the
statistical parameters between single voxels also change gradu-
ally throughout the brain (Huettel et al., 2009), “thresholding at
any α inevitably creates artificially sharp barriers between ‘active’
and ‘inactive’ regions” (Klein, 2010, p. 270). In other words, the
activity/non-activity distinction is vague because for any signif-
icance level there is a vaguely delineated class of p-values (such
as p = 0.049/0.051) for which it is indeterminate whether the
sentence “neurons in this voxel are active/are not active” is true
or false for a conventionally established but arbitrary thresh-
old (here: α = 0.05). Stipulating such arbitrary thresholds to
eliminate the vagueness of “activation” is neither restricted to
task-related functional imaging however, but has been also rec-
ognized for the construction of probabilistic cytoarchitectonic
maps (Amunts et al., 2004) and the study of anatomical and
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functional connectivity (Passingham et al., 2002). Nor is it a
problem is particular to neuroscience, since it applies to any
scientific discipline that studies causally dense systems, such as
economics (McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996) or ecology (Johnson,
1999), or applies conventional thresholds (most commonly α =
0.05) such as psychology (for an overview see Harlow et al., 1997)
or medicine (Sterne and Davey, 2001). But the globality of this
problem does not imply that neuroscience cannot tackle it in rela-
tionship to the specific implications for the study of the brain,
nor does it make impossible that meaningful assumptions about
the organization of the nervous system can be made. Rather, it
should encourage a discussion about the prospects of quantita-
tive assessments of signal changes in fMRI (Bandettini et al., 2000)
and neuropsychological models (Savoy, 2001). Furthermore, con-
sidering the issue of vagueness, it is important to note that
“significance” is an interest-relative concept (Fara, 2008): what
level of statistical significance is considered to be scientifically sig-
nificant depends on how many false-positives are accepted for
a given research context. “Interest” here means not the indi-
vidual but the purpose of a whole field of research, relative to
which the presence of false-positives is evaluated (e.g., func-
tional localization, cf. Passingham et al., 2002 or neurosurgery
cf. Gorgolewski et al., 2011). Taking this into account, the arbi-
trariness in choosing a particular threshold becomes relativized,
as long as significance tests are not used as unquestioned ritu-
als but as check on the experimental data which needs additional
reasoning for being validated (Gigerenzer, 2004; Amunts et al.,
2004).
Distinguishing vagueness from ambiguity in the case of fMRI
studies must not imply that the first one is utterly indepen-
dent from the technological specifications and methodological
assumptions in a specific research context. In fact, it is also rec-
ognized in philosophical research that context-sensitivity does
include more than just the canonical indexical parameters of
time, place, and speaker (Lewis, 1980). More specifically, it has
been proposed that for the use of vague predicates, the abilities
of the speakers have to be taken into account before evalu-
ating the truth value of a proposition. These abilities are not
individual but given through the field of knowledge which deter-
mines which propositions are expressible (an approach that
has been called “nonindexical contextualism,” cf. MacFarlane,
2007, for vagueness see Åkerman and Greenough, 2010 and
Keil, 2010). Such a position can explain the observation of
Saxe and colleagues about the laymen’s misinterpretation, by
pointing to the absent ability of determining which degree of
precision is built into a statement which is visualized by a func-
tional activation map. The case of the untrained reader may
be an obvious example, but when non-indexical contextual-
ism is combined with the interest-relativity of “significance”
described in the last paragraph, it can accommodate for much
subtler context-shifts that occur in neuroscientific studies of
connectivity, regarding assumptions built into used method-
ologies (“Anatomical Connectivity and Overlapping Networks”
and “Functional Connectivity I: Edge Detection Algorithms
and Functional Boundaries”) and the utilization of vague
concepts (“Functional Connectivity II: Research Contexts and
Combinatory Vagueness”).
IMPLICATIONS OF VAGUENESS FOR MAPPING
CONNECTIVITY OF THE HUMAN CEREBRAL CORTEX
ANATOMICAL CONNECTIVITY AND OVERLAPPING NETWORKS
Distinct patterns of axonal connections between different cortical
areas represent one criterion of determining anatomical bound-
aries in non-human and human studies (Felleman and Van Essen,
1991; Passingham et al., 2002). One central assumption is that
based on these connections, the brain can be described as consist-
ing of large-scale networks, which are internally segregated into
different communities, but nevertheless allow for high integra-
tion through internodal links (Tononi et al., 1994). This feature
of networks of any kind is called “small-worldness” and can be
represented by graph-theoretical analysis, where nodes are maxi-
mally clustered (indicating high segregation) and the characteris-
tic path length between any two nodes is not significantly different
from randomly distributed networks (indicating high integra-
tion, Watts and Strogatz, 1998). While small-worldness could be
demonstrated for functional connectivity in the macaque cortex,
because anatomical connections could be directly traced in vivo
(Stephan et al., 2000), determining these connections for the
human cerebral cortex remains challenging because they can only
be indirectly measured non-invasively. Moreover, the question
remains whether brain networks share with other real networks
the property of an overlapping community structure, where
nodes can belong to several communities (Palla et al., 2005).
In order to tackle the last question, Wu et al. (2011) con-
structed a structural brain network based on the measurement
of regional gray matter volume changes detectable in MRI scans.
Based on the assumption that changes in the morphometry corre-
late with different anatomical connections between cortical areas
(Mechelli et al., 2005), Wu and colleagues parcellated the gray
matter images into 90 areas and constructed an interregional
correlation matrix between all subjects, which could then be
transformed into a binarized and undirected network. They then
calculated for which parameter k (size of the subgraphs which
segregate the network into different communities) the mutual
information with the original network was the highest. Since the
maximum point was found at k = 7, where 15 nodes showed sin-
gular or multiple overlap, Wu and colleagues concluded that their
analysis revealed “fuzzy boundaries” between communities in the
structural brain network.
But can “fuzzy” here be understood in the technical sense of
vagueness, i.e., as allowing for borderline cases? It is plausible to
interpret the overlapping nodes as the shared boundaries between
networks, but that does not imply that this boundary is vaguely
defined. In fact, since similar connection patterns in a cluster
of areas are also described as a family sharing degrees of resem-
blance (Passingham et al., 2002), it seems more reasonable to use
the notion of “family resemblances” (Wittgenstein, 1953/2001) to
interpret overlapping nodes. A family resemblance concept (e.g.,
“game”) is characterized by having applications that stand in a
non-transitive relationship to each other, while not sharing a sin-
gle constant feature. Soccer and chess are both considered games,
but are linked only through an intermittent series of more similar
games. The semantic structure of such concepts can be consid-
ered to form networks with overlapping attributes (as assumed
by prototype theory, cf. Rosch and Mervis, 1975). Thus, if cortical
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areas could be linked through similar but non-identical connec-
tional patterns, overlapping nodes can be considered as the shared
attributes of a family resemblance relation. Although vague-
ness and family resemblance are not entirely separate linguistic
phenomena (see section “Functional Connectivity II: Research
Contexts and Combinatory Vagueness”), there are at least two
reasons to reject the family resemblance interpretation for this
particular study. First, the basis for the structural network of Wu
and colleagues were one-dimensional, gradable units of measure-
ment (cortical thickness and gray matter volume), while family
resemblant concepts necessarily have multi-dimensional features
which can be categorically distinct as well (instead of being
gradable). Second, structural networks constructed through mor-
phometric measurements can reveal hierarchical organization
(Bassett et al., 2008), while the non-transitivity of family resem-
blance concepts makes a clustering of members based on cumu-
lative similarity problematic.
If the disanalogy to the notion of family resemblances speaks
for interpreting overlapping nodes as cases of vagueness, what
could the borderline cases look like and how do they relate to
the issues described in the last two sections? The case of setting
thresholds arbitrarily at a point where overlap occurs can be ruled
out, because the criterion for k was maximality of mutual infor-
mation, and more importantly, the number of overlapping nodes
remained constant while applying different cost thresholds (ratio
between number of edges and possible edges) to the network.
Note that here, Wu and colleagues did not use a threshold that
shows the most dissimilar patterns of connections (Passingham
et al., 2002), because the purpose of their study was exploratory,
rather than testing any hypothesis about functional localization.
If these overlapping nodes can be considered predictors of their
functions (Palla et al., 2005), however, then the areas could repre-
sent borderline cases (in the sense of Passingham and colleagues),
in which it is indeterminate whether or not double dissociation
studies reveal which functional role a cortical area fulfills.
As the findings of Wu and colleagues were robust over different
thresholds and concerned with anatomical rather than functional
connectivity, the comparison to vagueness in the cytoarchitec-
tonic study of the brain deserves special attention. The first
connection between these two levels is provided by the authors
themselves when they write that “the overlapping community
structure would be changed by parcellation templates due to dif-
ferent boundaries between brain regions” (13). Here, it seems
like the vagueness of cytoarchitectonic (or other) parcellations of
the brain gets imported into the abstract representation of net-
work structure, suggesting that the fuzzy community boundaries
are analogous to higher-order vagueness, where the vagueness of
the object language gets imported into the meta-language (Varzi,
2001). The analogy is not necessarily correct however, since it is
possible that the overlapping community structure is an inde-
pendent organizational principle of the connectivity of the brain,
which is preserved even if cytoarchitectonic parcellation schemes
could be made perfectly precise. Moreover, since the distinction
between anatomical and functional connectivity is itself blurry
for the development of new axonal connections (cf. Fingelkurts
et al., 2005), the microscopic study of structural cell properties
should not be the only modality that evaluates the vagueness of
cortical networks. Despite these restrictions, is there a sense in
which overlapping nodes are related to the gradual transitions
observed in cytoarchitectonic studies? Such a relation is in princi-
ple possible, since it could be shown in rhesus monkey studies that
the anatomical connectivity patterns can be predicted from the
laminar structure of different cortical layers (Barbas and Rempel-
Clower, 1997). Whether this prediction does hold in the case
of human anatomical connectivity as well cannot currently be
determined empirically, because regional gray matter volume or
densities measured in 1 mm3 MRI voxels are not equivalent to
cytoarchitectonic cell packing densities (Mechelli et al., 2005). But
this impossibility is not only a problem of resolution but also a
conceptual one: “gray matter” is a not a sortal concept that picks
out individual entities in the world (for an overview see Pelletier,
2010). Thus, the question “how much gray matter is in a cor-
tical area?” can only be answered by using the appropriate unit
of measurement (e.g., mass per unit of volume). Consequently,
in order to transform gray matter volume data into a structural
network, a parcellation of cortical areas that utilizes sortal con-
cepts (such as “neuron” or “axon”) has to be already in place
(no matter how vaguely the cortex is parcellated by them). The
same caution holds for comparing the determined overlapping
community structure to diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), where
axonal connections are estimated from MRI scans by calculat-
ing the least hindered diffusion of water throughout the each
voxel. Since DTI methods are currently unable to detect the exact
origination and termination points of axonal connections, there
are no clear cases of precisely segregated connections (character-
ized as “ground truth” by Jbabdi and Johansen-Berg, 2011) which
could serve as a comparison class to the alleged borderline case
of overlapping connectivity of subnetworks (i.e., different net-
works sharing anatomical axonal connections). In other words,
given the current technological restrictions, the discovered fuzzy
boundaries between communities in the structural brain network
cannot be regarded as a case of extensional vagueness yet, because
the relationship to the underlying anatomical features remains to
be determined. But this technological shortcoming should again
not be taken to rule out that this study provides evidence for the
intensional vagueness of structurally connected brain networks.
FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITY I: EDGE DETECTION ALGORITHMS
AND FUNCTIONAL BOUNDARIES
The previous section already showed, to some extent, how
assumptions about the organizational properties of the cerebral
cortex are built into the algorithms used to computationally
analyze brain connectivity (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010). In this
section, the implications of vagueness will be further explored
for algorithmic procedures which are used to define functional
boundaries via resting state fMRI data. Unlike task-related fMRI,
resting state studies correlate time series of slow, low-frequency
hemodynamic responses across different areas, without testing
for experimentally induced differential changes in brain activa-
tion. Thus, the acquired BOLD-data reflect the statistical history
of co-activated areas that are functionally connected to each
other. The objective of this method is to delineate functional
boundaries in the cortex which are not assessable on the basis of
cytoarchitectonic studies at the microscopic scale or task-based
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functional localization alone (although these may be ultimately
connected, cf. Stephan et al., 2000; Passingham et al., 2002).
In a recent study, Cohen et al. (2008) proposed a method to
reveal the putative functional boundaries of the human cortex
by using the Canny edge detection algorithm (Canny, 1986) on
resting state fMRI data. To apply the algorithm, the simultane-
ously acquired structural MRI images were used to generate a
two-dimensional Cartesian grid by flattening the cortical surface
with as minimal distortion as possible. The Cartesian grid could
then be used to define volumetric seed regions by which the pre-
processed resting state functional connectivity MRI data could be
localized in the cortex. By correlating the time course of one seed
with the time courses of every other voxel, volumetric correlation
maps where created to compare the similarity of the connectivity
profiles of each seed region (expressed by the coefficient eta2). To
detect the putative functional boundaries between areas, the eta2
coefficients (values between 0 and 1 indicating no similarity or
complete identity) were thresholded at two points:
To prevent hysteresis, if the magnitude of the pixel is below the low
threshold, it is set to zero, while if the magnitude is above the high
threshold, it is considered an edge. If the magnitude of the pixel is
between the two thresholds, then the location is only considered
an edge if there is a neighboring pixel that itself has a gradient
above the high threshold
(Cohen et al., 2008, p. 49).
In using that method, Cohen and colleagues are assuring to
“identify and differentiate locations with strong, spatially coher-
ent peaks as being different from locations that are relatively
smooth or have incoherent gradient peaks” (Cohen et al., 2008).
The aim of eliminating the apparent uncertainty whether or not
values in between the two thresholds should be regarded as an
edge, is analogous to the aim of the philosophical theory of
supervaluationism, which was developed in order to preserve the
principles of classical logic from problems created by the Sorites-
paradox (Fine, 1975). In particular, borderline cases seem to
refute the principle of bivalence (i.e., that propositions are either
true or false) because they have truth value gaps (see section
“The Philosophical Concept of Vagueness”). Supervaluationism
attempts to preserve the bivalence principle by considering only
those cases as borderline cases which are true under some, but
false under other precisifications, while the clear cases are the
ones which are true and the clear non-cases are the ones being
false under all admissible precisifications (i.e., being super-true
or super-false). The advantage of the theory is that after the pro-
cess of supervaluation, all the borderline cases have a determinate
truth value under some precisification and thus do not possess
truth value gaps. Equivalently, the utilization of the binary edge
detection algorithm by Cohen and colleagues assigns to eta2 coef-
ficients the property of being an edge under some precisifications
(i.e., if eta2 of the neighboring pixel is above the threshold) and
not under others (if neighboring eta2 is between or below thresh-
olds). If the analogy between these two approaches is correct, then
determining functional boundaries via the binary edge detection
algorithms suffers from higher-order vagueness just as super-
valuationism does. Because the boundary between clear cases,
borderline cases, and non-cases is fuzzy, the term “admissible
precisification” in the supervaluationist semantic is itself vague
(cf. Williamson, 1994; Varzi, 2001). In the case of the binary edge
detection, however, higher-order vagueness is imported through
the use of arbitrary thresholds (see section “Thresholds and
Measurement of Neural Activity with fMRI”), which serve the
purpose to ensure spatial stability across short stretches of the
eta2 profiles (Cohen et al., 2008), because what counts as “short”
is vague. This observation does not discredit the algorithm as an
inappropriate method for defining boundaries per se, but it points
out that its methodological assumptions may be inappropriate
to deal with every part of the cortex equally. Just as some parts
of the brain were more prone to vagueness using cytoarchitec-
tonic criteria due to gradual transitions, some parts of the brain
may have more gradually changing functional connectivity pro-
files than others. The study of Cohen and colleagues confirms this
assumption, since they report three seed regions for which the
connectivity profile between the angular and supramarginal gyrus
did not show an abrupt change.
Analyzing methods in isolation, however, would give the
false impression of how neuroscientific research is in practice
organized, since explaining neural phenomena requires interro-
gations from different disciplinary perspectives and at multiple
scales (or levels, cf. Craver, 2007). Such a characterization can be
made about the example discussed above, to the extent that in a
different study, Nelson et al. (2010) used the binary edge detec-
tion algorithm together with other methods (task-related fMRI,
network analysis) to assemble convergent evidence about the
functional parcellation of the human left lateral parietal cortex.
Although philosophers usually acknowledge the importance of
convergent evidence in neuroscientific explanations (Churchland
and Sejnowski, 2000), it is not by itself clear whether convergence
points toward a fundamental level of explanation (Craver, 2007).
It also remains to be determined by further analysis how the
notion of convergent evidence relates to the contested view of
convergent realism in philosophy of science (for critiques see
Laudan, 1981; Hoyningen-Huene, 2011). What is important for
the present purpose, however, is that vagueness can transverse
these different research strategies as well. Because the binary edge
detection algorithms alone cannot be interpreted as reflecting
the underlying different functional connectivity profiles, Nelson
and colleagues also constructed a network for the left lateral
parietal cortex, based on defining neighborhood seed regions
across the cortex which had correlated connectivity profiles with
the ROIs. They were able to subdivide this network into entirely
distinct communities, following the purpose of functional local-
ization, where potentially overlapping (i.e., intensionally vague)
neighbors are excluded in the presence of abruptly changing
connectivity profiles.
But it becomes evident from the section “Anatomical
Connectivity and Overlapping Networks” and the reported inter-
mediate seed regions from Cohen and colleagues that this com-
munity structure is not the only possible or the most appropriate
parcellation of a cortical area. A study by Yeo et al. (2011) pro-
vides another recent example where one possible way to deal with
connectivity profiles is expressed. These authors studied intrinsic
functional connectivity of the whole cortex on a population basis.
One of the findings was a gradual transition in the functional
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correlations between areas V1 and V3, when shifting from input
from the central to the peripheral visual field. While expressing
the uncertainty how to accommodate for this result, an uncer-
tainty which is common when dealing with borderline cases, Yeo
and colleagues also conclude in their discussion that this grad-
ual transition can be turned into an “abrupt division into central
and peripheral networks when assignments into distinct networks
are forced, providing a convenient way to map the topographical
organization across visual areas” (1151). But finding a convenient
way to map gradual transitions is not sufficient to deal reasonably
with vagueness, because of the interest-relativeness of significance
and nonindexical contextual factors. These parameters become
especially important when parcellation schemes travel outside the
basic research into practical settings, where relying on boundary
locations has real-world consequences (e.g., clinical applications
such as neurosurgery). Here, mistakes could be made when the
ability to discriminate different degree of precision is not taken
into account (e.g., working with invasive instruments such as
scalpels, instead of imaging). Thus, neuroscientists need to be
aware that arbitrarily chosen boundaries do not simply corre-
spond to the brain’s underlying structure in a one-to-one manner
(just as functional boundaries and cytoarchitectonic do not need
to, cf. Huettel et al., 2009). How much vagueness is allowed into
the scientific descriptions of nature depends both on the purposes
of the researcher and on how adequately a concept is supposed to
capture the underlying properties of the object in question.
FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITY II: RESEARCH CONTEXTS AND
COMBINATORY VAGUENESS
While the last section explored from what level the vagueness
of delineating functional boundaries gets imported into resting
state connectivity studies, this section asks whether the charac-
ter of the studied neural phenomenon itself has implications for
the concept of “functional connectivity.” In order to address this
question it will be more helpful to begin in a reverse manner
by looking at the conceptual side first, since the term “func-
tional connectivity” has been criticized by Horwitz (2003) as
an elusive concept. The reason for this critique is the observa-
tion that researchers allegedly investigate the same phenomenon
while actually conducting experiments which determine func-
tional connectivity based on considerably different features: the
use of various imaging modalities (EEG, PET, MEG, fMRI) results
in different spatial and temporal resolutions as well as to whether
connectivity is assumed between neural activity, neuronal ensem-
bles or large-scale interactions. Furthermore, there are multiple
ways in which experimental parameters can be correlated (across
or within conditions, subjects, or time courses). Now although it
is correct to say that due to these different possibilities, there can
be unclarity about whether the same aspect of cortical organiza-
tion is explicated by various experiments, it is misleading to assign
the rather pejorative term of elusiveness to “functional connectiv-
ity” because of that fact. Such a characterization is quite similar
to the assumption that vagueness is a deficit of natural language
which has to be eliminated by formalization, a position expressed
by some philosophers of logic (e.g., Frege, 1893/1903; Russell,
1923). But after the focus on the language use of ordinary speakers
revealed that vagueness can play a positive role in communication
(Austin, 1975; Wittgenstein, 1953/2001), the deficit interpretation
is not upheld anymore in the contemporary theoretical literature
(Williamson, 1994; Hyde, 2007). Furthermore, there is no rea-
son to consider the concept as ill-defined since—as Horwitz also
acknowledges—the neuroscientific community has reached con-
sensus by using the definition of Friston (1994): “functional con-
nectivity” means “temporal correlation between spatially remote
neurophysiological events.” The definition provides an example of
two earlier observations concerning vagueness in neuroanatomy.
First, it shows that vagueness is not necessarily eliminated by
reaching consensus (as proposed by Saxe and colleagues), since
“spatial remoteness” is a vague concept which allows for differ-
ent borderline cases depending on the resolution of the imag-
ing modality (how small can “spatially remote” be?). Second,
vagueness is overlapping with other issues in empirical research
(“Thresholds and Measurement of Neural Activity with fMRI”)
since “neurophysiological event” is an ambiguous term which
can refer to different acting entities (e.g., single firing neurons,
differentially active areas). While spatial remoteness is a case of
one-dimensional degree-vagueness, the presence of one of these
events is a necessary (albeit alone insufficient) condition in order
to count a temporal correlation as functionally connected.
Taking these facts together, the characterization of functional
connectivity should not be considered as an elusive but as a com-
binatorially vague concept (Alston, 1967). Combinatorially vague
concepts (e.g., “religion”) are a subclass of family resemblance
concepts (see section “Anatomical Connectivity and Overlapping
Networks”) which allow for borderline cases of application (e.g.,
“religion” to the Quaker movement or ideologies such as commu-
nism). Although there are clear examples (e.g., Catholicism), the
list of features characterizing such a concept does neither com-
prise a list of necessary and together sufficient conditions, nor
does it require the shared characteristics of the “family members”
to stand in the same logical relation to each other. If the different
experimental possibilities pointed out above are now interpreted
as the feature list for the concept of functional connectivity, then
this concept admits for borderline cases of application because it
is not only unclear how spatially remote two events have to be
(degree-vagueness), but also because different family resemblant
events can fulfill the definition. However, there are two reasons
why these borderline cases cannot be easily detected. First, every
imaging modality and analysis step has certain advantages over
others, but no single one is superior in every respect, thus mak-
ing the existence of a “perfect instance” (where all features of the
list are fulfilled) of functional connectivity unlikely. Second, the
status of a clear case does not require a cumulative fulfillment
of the feature list, where the ones with more features are always
“clearer” (Wittgenstein, 1953/2001). That borderline cases only
become visible when different research contexts are compared,
can be elucidated by the response of Fingelkurts et al. (2005) to
the critique of Horwitz (2003). These authors proposed a neuro-
physiological interpretation of functional connectivity by using a
combined EEG/MEG study to measure phase synchronization of
electrical signals at both local and global spatial distances. When
this research context is taken as a reference frame for comparing
other functional connectivity studies, borderline cases arise due to
lack of certain features (e.g., high temporal specificity for an fMRI
Frontiers in Neuroanatomy www.frontiersin.org September 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 37 | 8
Haueis The fuzzy brain
study) or the missing comparability of experimental procedures
(e.g., within vs. across correlations).
How can researchers possibly deal with this type of vague-
ness? Note first that the quantification of the signal (compare
“Thresholds and Measurement of Neural Activity with fMRI”
section) is of no help here because dealing with combinatory
vagueness requires to decide whether or not a certain feature
should count as a condition for application of a concept (although
weighing these criteria may require some ordinal scale). Thus,
even if a quantitatively interpretable threshold for spatial remote-
ness is available and the research context is held fixed, functional
connectivity remains combinatorially vague due to the ambiguity
of “neurophysiological event.” At this point of the reconstruction,
the consensual solution seems the most plausible and straight-
forward one: once disambiguated, researchers find that the term
“functional connectivity” has several perfectly precise and dis-
tinct meanings which can be now labeled anew. But this solution
loses its plausibility once the object side is considered instead
of the conceptual side of the problem. Although the linguis-
tic phenomena of combinatory vagueness and ambiguity both
share the feature of polysemy (having multiple meanings), they
are not identical. Because in the former case, all the meanings
share a common core of extensions (Pinkal, 1995), while in the
latter, extensions do not usually overlap (recall the “bank” exam-
ple in “Thresholds and Measurement of Neural Activity with
fMRI”). The disambiguation of the neurophysiological interpre-
tations does therefore not reveal entirely different neuroscientific
phenomena, but rather different aspects of the same organiza-
tional principle of the brain. Therefore, the question neurosci-
entific researchers should ask is whether functional connectivity
is a principle general enough that it can be manifest at differ-
ent levels of neuroscientific research, even in the absence of a
clear correspondence to the anatomical connections. The prac-
tical relevance of combinatory vagueness can be exemplified by
considering once more the vagueness of networks formed by
functionally connected areas: Networks are not only gradually
vague with respect to the resemblance degree of connectivity pro-
files (“Anatomical Connectivity and Overlapping Networks”), but
also combinatorially vague with respect to the number of com-
munities. Individuating single communities follows a feature list
which does not have to be fulfilled in every research context, i.e.,
having an anatomical counterpart, sharing topographical features
with this counterpart etc. Addressing these questions may imply
that convergence of evidence (“Functional Connectivity I: Edge
Detection Algorithms and Functional Boundaries”) from differ-
ent subfields in the neuroanatomical community does not per se
lead to increasing precision, but could reveal different types of
vagueness as well (following Alston’s criterion that the definiens
should match the definiendum in its vagueness). If that observa-
tion is correct for the case discussed here, then the disambiguation
of “functional connectivity” would not lead to better research
because it would misconstrue an important characteristic of how
cortical organization is to be understood.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This paper provided a preliminary conceptual framework for
understanding vagueness in neuroanatomy at different levels of
research. It should encourage empirical researchers to engage in
a discussion about whether the concepts used in scientific prac-
tice express a notion of anatomical and functional organization
which is appropriate to understand the complex system of the
human brain. The importance of such a discussion is supported
by a recent trend in philosophy of science, which emphasizes
the interdependence of concept formation and experimentation
in empirical science (Wilson, 2006; Rouse, 2011). Note that the
philosophical discussion of vagueness is in an important sense
similar to the neuroscientific investigation of functional connec-
tivity: both are best seen as enterprises which are open toward
the future, and some of the positions presented here are the out-
come of an intensive theoretical discussion of the last 40 years of
philosophy of language and logic. A characteristic difference of
the approach proposed here, however, is that particular fields of
knowledge like neuroscience can be used to assess how adequately
general theories of the phenomenon of vagueness can deal with
particular issues of indeterminacy and fuzziness.
With this characterization in place, the results of the above
analysis can be summarized as follows: “Gradual Transitions in
Cytoarchitectonic Studies of Brain Anatomy” revealed that the
basis of vagueness in neuroanatomy is one-dimensional gradual
transitions of structural anatomical properties of the cortex. To
deal with this type of vagueness, researchers characterize cortical
regions in multiple modalities (cyto-, myelo-, and chemoarchtic-
ture), but in some cases all of these modalities can reveal a
transitional zone (such as 9/46). “Thresholds and Measurement
of Neural Activity with fMRI” proceeded to discuss the issue of
statistical thresholding in causally dense systems like the brain.
Here, quantification of the fMRI signal and neuropsychological
models may narrow the degree of arbitrariness, but that does
not provide a general solution to vagueness because significance
is an interest-relative concept and therefore dependent on spe-
cific neuroscientific research contexts. “Anatomical Connectivity
and Overlapping Networks” and “Functional Connectivity I: Edge
Detection Algorithms and Functional Boundaries” discussed then
how these two types of vagueness get imported into the study of
connectivity in the human cortex. The overlapping community
structure of structural brain networks suggests an intensional
vagueness of delineating cortical areas based on anatomical con-
nectivity, because the indirect measure of axonal connections
does not provide evidence for actual borderline cases, but only
possible ones. In case of determining functional boundaries, the
analysis of edge detection algorithms showed that the decision
rule for classifying voxels in non-, borderline, and clear cases of
edges suffers from higher-order vagueness in the same way super-
valuationism does. This observation is supported empirically by
gradual transitions in functional connectivity profiles. “Functional
Connectivity II: Research Contexts and Combinatory Vagueness”
then asked more generally, whether the neural phenomenon of
functional connectivity is a source for the combinatory vague-
ness of comparing its manifestation in different experimental
settings. If that type of vagueness indicates an organizational
principle of the brain, then a discussion about the conceptual
articulation of properties of the human cortex is needed.
Despite the theoretical discussion in this paper, there are also
further possibilities to deal with vagueness in empirical studies.
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To characterize indeterminacy, some structural MRI researchers
are using fuzzy clustering methods to describe the volumet-
ric and cardiac features of resonance images (Kobashi et al.,
2007; Kurkure et al., 2009; Lin et al., 2010). Fuzzy logic applies
different degrees of truth to the propositions expressed by sen-
tences that contain vague predicates (Zadeh, 1965). Functional
neuroanatomists could pursue a fusion of this “fuzzy mode of
medical thinking” (Seising, 2006) and the application of fuzzy
set theory already in place in neural networks (Kosko, 1992) by
integrating these clustering methods in the study of anatomi-
cal and functional connectivity. It should be also noted, how-
ever, that it has been repeatedly questioned by philosophers
whether the fuzzy logic approach provides a satisfying solu-
tion to vagueness, because it is over-precisifying statements
whose communicative use is generated by their fuzzy referen-
tial boundaries (cf. Keil, 2010). More particularly for vagueness
in neuroanatomy, quantification does not provide a solution to
combinatory vagueness (see section “Functional Connectivity
II: Research Contexts and Combinatory Vagueness”). Thus,
using philosophical vocabulary to analyze issues in the empir-
ical study of the brain can produce a fruitful discourse
beside the more traditional encounters between brain scien-
tists and philosophers regarding the relationship between mind
and body.
REFERENCES
Åkerman, J., and Greenough, P. (2010).
“Vagueness and non-indexical
contextualism,” in New Waves in
Philosophy of Language, ed S. Sawyer
(Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave
Macmillan), 8–23.
Alston, W. (1967). “Vagueness,” in The
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 7,
ed P. Edwards (London, New York:
MacMillan), 218–221.
Amunts, K., Schleicher, A., and Zilles,
K. (2002). “Architectonic mapping
of the human cerebral cortex,” in
Cortical Areas: Unity and Diversity,
eds E. Streissler, A. Schüz, and R.
Miller (London, New York: Taylor
and Francis), 29–51.
Amunts, K., Weiss, P. H., Mohlberg, H.,
Pieperhoff, P., Eickhoff, S., Gurd, J.
M., Marshall, J. C., Shah, N. J., Fink,
G. R., and Zilles, K. (2004). Analysis
of neural mechanisms underlying
verbal fluency in cytoarchitectoni-
cally defined stereotaxic space–the
roles of Brodmann areas 44 and 45.
Neuroimage 22, 42–56.
Austin, J. L. (1975). How to do Things
With Words, 2nd Edn. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Bandettini, P. A., Birn, R. M., and
Donahue, K. M. (2000). “Functional
MRI: background, methodology,
limits, and implementation,” in
Handbook of Psychophysiology, 2nd
Edn, eds L. G. Tassinary and G.
G. Berntson (Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press),
978–1014.
Barbas, H., and Rempel-Clower, N.
(1997). Cortical structure predicts
the pattern of corticocortical con-
nections. Cereb. Cortex 7, 635–646.
Bartels, A., Logothetis, N., and
Moutoussis, K. (2008). fMRI and
its interpretations: an illustra-
tion on directional selectivity in
area V5/MT. Trends Neurosci. 31,
444–453.
Bassett, D., Bullmore, E., Verchinski,
B., Mattay, V., Weinberger, D.,
and Meyer-Lindenberg, A. (2008).
Hierarchical organization of human
cortical networks in health and
schizophrenia. J. Neurosci. 28,
9239–9248.
Brodmann, K. (1905). Beiträge zur
histologischen Lokalisation der
Großhirnrinde. III. Mitteilung: die
Rindenfelder der niederen Affen. J.
Psychol. Neurol. 4, 177–225.
Brodmann, K. (1909). Vergleichende
Lokalisationslehre der Großhirnrinde.
Leipzig: Barth.
Campbell, A. (1905). Histological
Studies on the Localisation of
Cerebral Function. Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press.
Canny, J. (1986). A computational
approach to edge detection. IEEE
Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. 8,
679–698.
Churchland, P., and Sejnowski, T. J.
(2000). “Perspectives on neuro-
science,” in Cognitive Neuroscience,
ed M. S. O. Gazzaniga (Oxford:
Blackwell), 14–24.
Cohen, A. L., Fair, D. A., Dosenbach,
N. U. F., Miezin, F. M., Dierker,
D., Van Essen, D. C., Schlaggar,
B. L., and Petersen, S. E. (2008).
Defining functional areas in indi-
vidual human brains using rest-
ing functional connectivity MRI.
Neuroimage 41, 45–57.
Craver, C. F. (2007). Explaining the
Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic
Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Devlin, J., and Poldrack, R. A. (2007).
In praise of tedious anatomy.
Neuroimage 37, 1033–1041.
Economo, C., and von Koskinas, G.
N. (1925). Die Cytoarchitektonik
der Hirnrinde des erwachsenen
Menschen. Berlin: Springer.
Endicott, T. A. (2001). Vagueness in Law.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fara, D. G. (2008). Profiling interest-
relativity. Analysis 68, 326–335.
Felleman, D. J., and Van Essen, D.
C. (1991). Distributed hierarchical
processing in the primate cerebral
cortex. Cereb. Cortex 1, 1–47.
Fine, K. (1975). Vagueness, truth and
logic. Synthese 30, 265–300.
Fingelkurts, A., Fingelkurts, A., and
Kahkonen, S. (2005). Functional
connectivity in the brain–is it an
elusive concept? Neurosci. Biobehav.
Rev. 28, 827–836.
Fischl, B., Rajendran, N., Busa, E.,
Augustinack, J., Hinds, O., Yeo,
B., Mohlberg, H., Amunts, K., and
Zilles, K. (2008). Cortical folding
patterns and predicting cytoarchi-
tecture. Cereb. Cortex 18, 1973–1980.
Frege, G. (1893/1903). Grundgesetze der
Arithmetik. 2nd reprint of the Jena
edition, 1998. Hildesheim: Georg
Olms.
Friston, K. J. (1994). Functional and
effective connectivity in neuroimag-
ing: a synthesis. Hum. Brain Mapp.
2, 56–78.
Gigerenzer, G. (2004). Mindless statis-
tics. J. Soc. Econ. 33, 587–606.
Gorgolewski, K., Bastin, M., Rigolo, L.,
Soleiman, H. A., Pernet, C., Storkey,
A., and Golby, A. J. (2011). Pitfalls
of thresholding statistical maps in
presurgical fMRI mapping. Proc.
Intl. Soc. Mag. Reson. Med. 19, 2430.
Harlow, L. L., Mulaik, S. A., and Steiger,
J. H. (eds.). (1997). What if there
were no Significance Tests? Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
Publishers.
Hinds, O., Polimeni, J. R., Rajendran,
N., Balasubramanian, M., Amunts,
K., Zilles, K., Schwartz, E. L.,
Fischl, B., and Triantafyllou, C.
(2009). Locating the functional and
anatomical boundaries of human
primary visual cortex. Neuroimage
46, 915–922.
Horwitz, B. (2003). The elusive concept
of brain connectivity. Neuroimage
19(2 Pt 1), 466–470.
Hoyningen-Huene, P. (2011). “The
ultimate argument against conver-
gent realism and structural realism:
the impasse objection,” in Congress
of the European Philosophy of Science
Association, (Athens: Congress of




Huettel, S. A., Song, A. W., and
McCarthy, G. (2009). Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 2nd
Edn. New York, NY: W. H. Freeman.
Hyde, D. (2007). Vagueness, Logic,
and Ontology. Aldershot, Hants,
England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate
Publisher.
Jansen, K., Faull, R., Dragunow,
M., and Leslie, R. A. (1991).
Distribution of excitatory and
inhibitory amino acid, sigma,
monoamine, catecholamine, acetyl-
choline, opioid, neurotensin,
substance P, adenosine and neu-
ropeptide Y receptors in human
motor and somatosensory cortex.
Brain Res. 566, 225–238.
Jbabdi, S., and Johansen-Berg, H.
(2011). Tractography: where do we
go from here? Brain Connect. 1,
169–183.
Johnson, D. H. (1999). The insignif-
icance of statistical significance
testing. Invited paper. J. Wildlife
Manage. 63, 763–772.
Keefe, R., and Smith, P. (eds.). (1996).
Vagueness: A Reader. 1st Edn.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Keil, G. (2010). “Halbglatzen statt
Halbwahrheiten. über Vagheit,
Wahrheits- und Auflösungsgrade,”
in Wahrheit - Bedeutung - Existenz,
eds M. Grajner and A. Rami
(Frankfurt, Heusenstamm, Paris,
Lancaster, New Brunswick, NJ:
Ontos-Verlag), 57–86.
Klein, C. (2010). Images are not the evi-
dence in neuroimaging. Br. J. Philos.
Sci. 61, 265–278.
Kobashi, S., Sueyoshi, S., Kondo, K.,
and Hata, Y. (2007). “Automated
gyrus labeling using knowledge-
based fuzzy inference systems,” in
2007 IEEE International Conference
on System of Systems Engineering
(IEEE), (San Antonio, TX), 1–6.
Kosko, B. (1992). Neural Networks and
Fuzzy Systems: A Dynamical Systems
Approach to Machine Intelligence.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Kurkure, U., Pednekar, A., Muthupillai,
R., Flamm, S., and Kakadiaris, A.
Frontiers in Neuroanatomy www.frontiersin.org September 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 37 | 10
Haueis The fuzzy brain
(2009). Localization and segmenta-
tion of left ventricle in cardiac cine-
MR images. IEEE Trans. Biomed.
Eng. 56, 1360–1370.
Laudan, L. (1981). The confutation of
convergent realism. Philos. Sci. 48,
19–49.
Lewis, (1980). “Index, context, and con-
tent,” in Philosophy and Grammar,
eds S. Kanger and S. Öhman
(Dordrecht: Reidel), 79–100.
Lin, G.-C., Wang, W.-J., Wang, C.-M.,
and Sun, S.-Y. (2010). Automated
classification of multi-spectral MR
images using linear discriminant
analysis. Comput. Med. Imaging.
Graph. 34, 251–268.
Logothetis, N. (2008). What we can and
cannot do with fMRI. Nature 453,
869–878.
MacFarlane, J. (2007). Nonindexical
contextualism. Synthese 166,
231–250.
McCloskey, D., and Ziliak, S. T. (1996).
The standard error of regressions.
J. Econ. Lit. 34, 97–114.
Mechelli, A., Friston, K., Frackowiak,
R., and Price, C. (2005). Structural
covariance in the human cortex.
J. Neurosci. 25, 8303–8310.
Nelson, S. M., Cohen, A. L., Power,
J. D., Wig, G. S., Miezin, F. M.,
Wheeler, M. E., Velanova, K.,
Donaldson, D. I., Phillips, J. S.,
Schlaggar, B. L., and Petersen, S. E.
(2010). A parcellation scheme for
human left lateral parietal cortex.
Neuron 67, 156–170.
Ohki, K., Matsuda, Y., Ajima, A.,
Kim, D.-S., and Tanaka, S. (2000).
Arrangement of orientation pin-
wheel centers around area 17/18
transition zone in cat visual cortex.
Cereb. Cortex 10, 593–601.
Ojemann, J. G., Akbudak, E., Snyder,
A. Z., McKinstry, R. C., Raichle,
M. E., and Conturo, T. E. (1997).
Anatomic localization and quan-
titative analysis of gradient refo-
cused echo-planar fMRI susceptibil-
ity artifacts. Neuroimage 6, 156–167.
Palla, G., Derenyi, I., Farkas, I., and
Vicsek, T. (2005). Uncovering the
overlapping community structure
of complex networks in nature and
society. Nature 435, 814–818.
Passingham, R. E., Stephan, K. E., and
Kötter, R. (2002). The anatomical
basis of functional localization in
the cortex. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 3,
606–616.
Payne, B. R. (1990). Representation of
the ipsilateral visual field in the
transition zone between areas 17
and 18 of the cat’s cerebral cortex.
Vis. Neurosci. 4, 445–474.
Pelletier, F. J. (ed). (2010). Kinds,
Things, and Stuff: Mass Terms and
Generics. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Petrides, M., and Pandya, D. N. (1999).
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: com-
parative cytoarchitectonic analysis
in the human and the macaque
brain and corticocortical connec-
tion patterns. Eur. J. Neurosci. 11,
1011–1036.
Pinkal, M. (1995). Logic and Lexicon:
The Semantics of the Indefinite.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press.
Rajkowska, G., and Goldman-Rakic, P.
S. (1995a). Cytoarchitectonic def-
inition of prefrontal areas in the
normal human cortex: I. remap-
ping of areas 9 and 46 using quan-
titative criteria. Cereb. Cortex 5,
307–322.
Rajkowska, G., and Goldman-Rakic, P.
S. (1995b). Cytoarchitectonic defi-
nition of prefrontal areas in the nor-
mal human cortex: II. Variability in
locations of areas 9 and 46 and rela-
tionship to the talairach coordinate
system. Cereb. Cortex 5, 323–337.
Rakic, P. (1988). Specification of cere-
bral cortical areas. Science 241,
170–176.
Rosch, E., and Mervis, C. (1975).
Family resemblances: studies in
the integral structure of categories.
Cogn. Psychol. 7, 573–605.
Rouse, J. (2011). Articulating the world:
experimental systems and concep-
tual understanding. Int. Stud. Philos.
Sci. 25, 243–254.
Rubinov, M., and Sporns, O. (2010).
Complex network measures of brain
connectivity: uses and interpreta-
tions. Neuroimage 52, 1059–1069.
Russell, B. (1923). Vagueness. Aus-
tralasian J. Psychol. Philos. 1, 84–92.
Sanides, F. (1964). Locating the func-
tional and anatomical boundaries
of human primary visual cortex.
J. Hirnforsch. 6, 269–282.
Sarkissov, S., Filimonoff, I., and
Preobrashenskaya, N. (1949).
Cytoarchitecture of the Human
Cortex Cerebri. Moscow: Medgiz.
Savoy, R. (2001). History and future
directions of human brain map-
ping and functional imaging. Acta
Psychol. 107, 9–42.
Saxe, R., Brett, M., and Kanwisher,
N. (2010). “Divide and conquer:
a defense of functional localizers,”
in Foundational Issues in Human
Brain Mapping, eds S. J. Hanson and
M. Bunzl (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press), 25–42.
Schneider, M., and Erwig, M. (1997).
“Vague regions,” in Advances in
Spatial Databases: 5th International
Symposium, SSD ‘97, Berlin,
Germany, July 15-18, 1997,
Proceedings, eds M. O. Scholl
and A. Voisard (Berlin, New York:
Springer), 298–320.
Seising, R. (2006). From vagueness in
medical thought to the foundations
of fuzzy reasoning in medical diag-
nosis. Artif. Intell. Med. 38, 237–256.
Smith, E. (1907). A new topographical
survey of the human cerebral cortex,
being an account of the distribution
of the anatomically distinct cortical
areas and their relationship to the
cerebral sulci. J. Anat. Physiol. 41,
237–254.
Stephan, K. E., Hilgetag, C.-C., Burns,
G., O’Neill, M., Young, M., and
Kötter, R. (2000). Computational
analysis of functional connectivity
between areas of primate cerebral
cortex. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B
Biol. Sci. 355, 111–126.
Sterne, J. A., and Davey, S. (2001).
Sifting the evidence-what’s wrong
with significance tests? BMJ 322,
226–231.
Tehovnik, E. J., Tolias, A. S., Sultan,
F., Slocum, W. M., and Logothetis,
N. K. (2006). Direct and indi-
rect activation of cortical neurons
by electrical microstimulation. J.
Neurophysiol. 96, 512–521.
Tononi, G., Sporns, O., and Edelman,
G. M. (1994). A measure for brain
complexity: relating functional seg-
regation and integration in the ner-
vous system. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 91, 5033–5037.
Tye, M. (1990). Vague objects. Mind 99,
535–557.
Unger, P. (1980). The problem of
the many. Midwest Stud. Philos. 5,
411–467.
Varzi, A. (2001). Vagueness in geogra-
phy. Philos. Geogr. 4, 49–65.
Vogt, C., and Vogt, O. (1925).
Allgemeinere Ergebnisse unserer
Hirnforschung. J. Psychol. Neurol.
25, 292–398.
von Bonin, G., and Bailey, P. (1951).
The Isocortex of Man. Urbana, IL:
University of Illinois Press.
Walker, A. (1940). A cytoarchitectural
study of the prefrontal areaof the
macaque monkey. J. Comp. Neurol.
73, 59–86.
Watts, D. J., and Strogatz, S. H.
(1998). Collective dynamics of
‘small-world’ networks. Nature 393,
440–442.
Williamson, T. (1994). Vagueness.
London: Routledge.
Wilson, M. (2006). Wandering Sig-
nificance. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953/2001).
Philosophical Investigations. The
German text, with a revised English
translation. 3rd Edn. Oxford,
Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Wu, K., Taki, Y., Sato, K., Sassa,
Y., Inoue, K., Goto, R., Okada,
K., Kawashima, R., He, Y., Evans,
A. C., and Fukuda, H. (2011).
The overlapping community struc-
ture of structural brain network
in young healthy individuals. PLoS
ONE 6:e19608. doi: 10.1371/jour-
nal.pone.0019608
Yeo, B. T., Krienen, F. M., Sepulcre,
J., Sabuncu, M. R., Lashkari, D.,
Hollinshead, M., Roffman, J. L.,
Smoller, J. W., Zöllei, L., Polimeni, J.
R., Fischl, B., Liu, H., and Buckner,
R. L. (2011). The organization of the
human cerebral cortex estimated by
intrinsic functional connectivity. J.
Neurophysiol. 106, 1125–1165.
Zadeh, L. (1965). Fuzzy sets. Inf.
Control 8, 338–353.
Zhang, Q. (1998). Fuzziness - vague-
ness - generality - ambiguity. J.
Pragmat. 29, 13–31.
Zilles, K., Palomero-Gallagher, N.,
Grefkes, C., Scheperjans, F., Boy,
C., Amunts, K., and Schleicher,
A. (2002). Architectonics of






Zilles, K., Schlaug, G., Matelli, M.,
Luppino, G., Schleicher, A., Qu,
M., Dabringhaus, A., Seitz, R., and
Roland, P. E. (1995). Mapping of
human and macaque sensorimo-
tor areas by integrating architec-
tonic, transmitter receptor, MRI
and PET data. J. Anat. 187(Pt 3),
515–537.
Zilles, K., and Schleicher, A. (1993).
“Cyto- and myeloarchitecture
of human visual cortex and the
periodical GABA-A receptor distri-
bution.” in Functional Organization
of the Human Visual Cortex, eds
B. Gulyas, D. Ottoson, and P.
Roland (Oxford: Pergamon Press),
111–120.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 02 May 2012; accepted: 15
August 2012; published online: 05
September 2012.
Citation: Haueis P (2012) The fuzzy
brain. Vagueness and mapping connec-
tivity of the human cerebral cortex.
Front. Neuroanat. 6:37. doi: 10.3389/
fnana.2012.00037
Copyright © 2012 Haueis. This is
an open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in other
forums, provided the original authors
and source are credited and subject to any
copyright notices concerning any third-
party graphics etc.
Frontiers in Neuroanatomy www.frontiersin.org September 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 37 | 11
